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Comment: The Need for Syncretism in
Applied Statistics
Sander Greenland
It is an honor to comment on Prof. Efron’s lat-
est contribution to the merging of frequentist and
Bayesian thinking into a harmonious (even if not
strictly coherent) statistical viewpoint. I will review
my thinking along those lines and some inspirations
for it. I agree with most of Dr. Efron’s views ex-
pressed here and in Efron (2005), with these im-
portant exceptions: First, I disagree that frequen-
tism has supplied a good set of working rules. In-
stead, I argue that frequentism has been a prime
source of reckless overconfidence in many fields (es-
pecially but not only in the form of 0.05-level test-
ing; see Rothman, Greenland and Lash, 2008, Chap-
ter 10 for examples and further citations). I also dis-
agree that Bayesians are more aggressive than fre-
quentists in modeling. The most aggressive model-
ing is that which fixes unknown parameters at some
known constant like zero (whence they disappear
from the model and are forgotten), thus generating
overconfident inferences and an illusion of simplic-
ity; such practice is a hallmark of conventional fre-
quentist applications in observational studies.
As working rules, the problem with conventional
methods lies not so much with frequentism, but
rather with frequentist tools for designed experi-
ments being misapplied to observational data
(Greenland, 2005a). Bayesians can and do misap-
ply their methods similarly; they just haven’t been
given as much opportunity to do so. Conversely,
many frequentist as well as Bayesian tools for obser-
vational studies have been developed, especially for
sensitivity analysis. But the overconfidence problem
has been perpetuated by the ongoing concealment
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of unbelievable point-mass priors within models in
order to maintain frequentist identification of target
parameters.
The problem can be addressed by sacrificing iden-
tification and replacing bad modeling assumptions
with explicit and reasonable priors (Gustafson, 2005;
Greenland, 2005a, 2009a). Perhaps ironically, fre-
quentist thought experiments and simulations can
then provide both contextual and frequentist diag-
nostics (Rubin, 1984; Greenland, 2006; Gustafson
and Greenland, 2009). Thus, frequentist thinking
can address Bayesian overconfidence just as Bayesian
thinking can address frequentist overconfidence.
Hence I would strengthen Box’s plea for ecumenism
(Box, 1983) into an imperative to fuse Bayesian and
frequentist concepts and methods in statistical
inference—and in teaching as well. This theme is far
from new (e.g., besides Box, see Good, 1983; Diaco-
nis and Freedman and discussants, 1986; Samaniego
and Reneau, 1994), yet it has barely touched every-
day teaching and practice. In this case (unlike many)
that is not because of software limitations; in fact,
for the bulk of applications the same software can be
used for both frequentist and Bayesian calculations
(Greenland, 2007, 2009a).
HIERARCHICAL MODELING: WHERE PRIORS
AND FREQUENCIES MEET
Bayesian and frequentist ideas intertwine in hi-
erarchical modeling (Efron’s Section 9), which en-
compasses both Bayesian and empirical-Bayes ap-
proaches (Good, 1983, 1987) as well as other shrink-
age techniques. Efron and Morris (1973, 1975) were
among the earliest to demonstrate convincingly that
hierarchical models offered practical as well as the-
oretical advantages for data analysis. Their writings
(along with those of Jack Good, George Box and Ed-
ward Leamer) inspired my applications of hierarchi-
cal modeling and Bayesian methods in epidemiology,
where the hierarchy levels are naturally determined
by physical structures and observation processes.
As an example, in nearly all observational stud-
ies of nutrient effects, individual risks are regressed
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directly on nutrient intakes calculated from food in-
takes. This conventional model makes no further
use of the food intakes, and so assumes implicitly
that foods have no effect on risk beyond their calcu-
lated nutrient content. This is an unsupported and
very doubtful assumption. A more realistic model al-
lows food effects beyond measured-nutrient content.
However, the resulting two-level hierarchical model
is not identified without a prior because nutrient
intakes are linear functions of food intakes (mak-
ing nutrient and food intakes completely collinear).
Using any contextually defensible prior reveals that
the conventional analysis generates overconfident in-
ferences, both in the Bayesian sense of overstating
information (Greenland, 2000), and also in the fre-
quentist sense of producing interval undercoverage
(Gustafson and Greenland, 2006). That overconfi-
dence may explain the rather embarrassing track
record of nutritional epidemiology when compared
against clinical trials (Lawlor et al., 2004). Ecologic
analyses provide other examples in which use of the
natural hierarchical structure with explicit priors is
needed to avoid overconfidence (Wakefield, 2009).
In this work, I have come to appreciate that a
simultaneously Bayesian and frequentist viewpoint
is essential for a credible analysis of observational
data. I must be at least informally Bayesian, know-
ing that there is no contextual credibility without
consideration and use of prior information, espe-
cially in model specification. But I should also be
at least informally frequentist, knowing that priors
should be weighted lightly unless they derive from
statistical observations such as frequencies in par-
tially exchangeable past experience (e.g., surveys)
or classical measurement processes (e.g., laboratory
determinations). Most of all, I should not rigidly ad-
here to ideologies or models, especially when a clash
between my prior and my likelihood function shows
that my understanding of the situation is more de-
ficient than I initially thought (Box, 1980, 1990).
PRIORS: EVERYBODY USES THEM (BUT
MOST CALL THEM “MODELS”)
As Efron illustrates in Section 4, all analyses la-
beled as frequentist are built on priors, although
these priors are called “models,” which avoids the
controversies associated with overtly Bayesian anal-
ysis (Leamer, 1978; Box, 1980, 1983). Even the sim-
plest randomized-trial analysis is based on a model,
namely the prior belief that treatment was random-
ized fairly, and the reported subjects actually exist.
As numerous cases of fraud demonstrate, that be-
lief may be mistaken more often than those receiv-
ing medical treatment would like to think (e.g., see
Greenland, 2009b).
Labeling assumptions and models as prior beliefs
might better alert us to the act of faith involved in
their use. As Box (1980) said
I believe that it is impossible logically to distin-
guish between model assumptions and the prior
distribution of the parameters. The model is
the prior in the wide sense that it is a probabil-
ity statement of all the assumptions currently
to be tentatively entertained a priori. On this
view, traditional sampling theory was of course
not free from assumptions of prior knowledge.
Instead it was as if only two states of mind had
been allowed: complete certainty or complete
uncertainty.
I have grown increasingly uncomfortable with the
convention of failing to label models as priors. It en-
courages the use of arbitrary constraints, and ques-
tions constraints only if the analysis data (the direct
evidence) can reveal departures—even though stud-
ies are not designed with anywhere near sufficient
power to reveal all important model violations. The
representation of modeling constraints in belief net-
works (Madigan, Mosurski and Almond, 1997) can
aid in the display of these constraints as imposed
beliefs and thus expose implausible aspects of the
model, although of course it cannot address data
limitations. Yet single datasets are often too limited
to tell us much about either the effects under study
or our models (Robins and Greenland, 1986)—at
least if we do not impose a hoard of dubious in-
dependence constraints that amount to point-mass
priors with no supporting data.
Additivity in generalized linear models is an ex-
ample: with n covariates, additivity sets all orders
of product terms (“interactions”) among them to
zero, and is equivalent to using a point mass at
zero for the joint prior on these terms. Entering the
few “significant” two-way products hardly makes a
dent in this set of constraints if n > 5; yet n > 8
is common and n > 20 not unusual. Arbitrary ad-
ditive constraints can be relatively harmless when
estimating a population-average effect, because the
specification error they entail may average out in
much the way random residual error does (Green-
land and Maldonado, 1994). But the constraints can
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be deadly when used for individual (clinical) risk
prediction, as adverse drug interactions demonstrate.
Hierarchical methods offer one way to relax ad-
ditivity constraints in a controlled fashion, by in-
cluding all or many products but shrinking their
estimates toward zero or a second-level structure
(Wakefield, De Vocht and Hung, 2010). More gen-
erally, we can expand an unrealistic conventional
model by embedding it in a richer, more realistic
hierarchical model, then shrink estimates from the
latter using prior distributions. Aspects of these dis-
tributions may be chosen to improve frequency per-
formance in high-dimensional problems, but such
methods do not preclude the use of prior informa-
tion to judge those and other aspects of the formal
prior distribution.
THE NEED FOR EXPLICIT PRIORS IN
OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
My discomfort with conventional treatments of
modeling has increased knowing that observational
data analysis can identify causal effects only by us-
ing indirect evidence, no matter how large the dataset
or how informed by past observational data. This
is the usual situation in epidemiology, where con-
founders, selection-probability ratios, or valid ex-
posure measurements are unavailable for analysis
(Greenland, 2005a; Gustafson, 2005; Rothman,
Greenland and Lash, 2008, Chapter 19; Lash, Fox
and Fink, 2009). The problem is a variant of the non-
identifiability of a regression coefficient when some
regressors are latent (Leamer, 1974). In these cases a
credible formal analysis must introduce proper pri-
ors in place of overconfident identifying constraints.
Use of identified regression models as sources of
effect estimates corresponds to a multidimensional
point prior that says there is no uncontrolled con-
founding or selection bias, and that measurements
(including validation measurements) were accurate
or at least reliable for life histories. Taken jointly,
these assumptions are absurd in topics like nutri-
tional and “lifestyle” epidemiology. But relaxing
these silly and harmful assumptions leads to a realm
where most Bayesians as well as frequentists fear to
tread: Specification of prior distributions that can-
not be effectively checked or updated with the anal-
ysis data.
When the scientific validity of each analysis hinges
on extensive and untestable prior specifications, an
analysis can be no more than a rough guess about a
vast unknown, and represents but one element in a
sensitivity analysis (Greenland, 2005b). This is true
even of a formal sensitivity analysis, which is lim-
ited to examining a few parameters lest it become
unintelligible. In this reality, the importance of spe-
cific models and priors should be de-emphasized in
favor of providing a framework for sensitivity anal-
ysis across plausible models and priors. Accuracy of
computation becomes secondary to prior specifica-
tion, which is too often neglected under the rubric
of “objective Bayes” (a.k.a. “please don’t bother me
with the science” Bayes).
There is simply no point in trying to do well at all
conceivable parameter values given the model when
the model embedding the parameter has already
imposed doubtful point constraints. Hence I have
sought approaches in which informative priors are
central. Good (1983) provided the key ingredients:
Priors can be transformed into penalty functions,
which can then be transformed into “prior data”
that generate the penalties as log-likelihood con-
tributions. This transformation allows evaluation of
prior-knowledge claims in a currency familiar to the
subject-matter expert, as well as use of familiar and
rapid fitting methods for basic models (Bedrick,
Christensen and Johnson, 1996, 1997; Greenland,
2006, 2007, 2009a, 2009c).
Note that conversion of priors to prior data does
not require conjugacy; it only requires that the penal-
ties have representations as transformed likelihoods
from a series of observations or experiments. The
credibility of the prior may be questioned if such a
representation is absent, arcane, or absurd. Evalua-
tion of priors in terms of equivalent data is partic-
ularly illuminating in human-subject fields, where
data are expensive and hence sparse. Here, strong
priors may be seen as claiming access to a volume of
data that does not exist, thus casting doubt on prior
assertions of some experts (Higgins and Spiegelhal-
ter, 2002; Greenland, 2006).
When priors (the indirect evidence) are recali-
brated to match the frequentist outputs of reason-
ably sized thought experiments, the combined evi-
dence will often be too limited to distinguish among
the effect sizes at issue (Greenland, 2009c). This is
unwelcome news to some colleagues, albeit no news
to others. Regardless, the future of indirect evidence
should be recognition for what it is: Omnipresent
and essential for any inference beyond “more re-
search is needed” (which may the strongest conclu-
sion we can hope to wrest from most studies, albeit
not always justifiable in economic terms).
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Thus I would conclude by echoing Efron: Whether
Bayesian, frequentist, ecumenic, or syncretic, statis-
ticians need to become better at creating and evalu-
ating contextually informed models—which include
both well-informed prior distributions and sensible
qualitative structures. It follows that statistical train-
ing should introduce informative-Bayesian methods
in tandem with classical (and often destructive) fre-
quentist methods, rather than as an afterthought
or specialty topic. Data priors provide one easy and
natural way to do so, displaying as they do the sym-
metry between indirect and direct evidence, and ex-
posing priors to a new angle of criticism.
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